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: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Crime Victims' Bill of Rights

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights: Amend Chapter 11 of Title 15, Title
17, and Article 3 of Chapter 9 of Title 24 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated, Relating to Juvenile Proceedings, Criminal
Procedure, and Examination of Witnesses, Respectively, so as to
Expand Provisions Relative to Victims’ Participation in the Court
System in Juvenile and State Courts; Change Provisions Relating
to Victim Impact Statements in Delinquency Proceedings; Provide
That Victims May Be Present in Juvenile Court Hearings; Require
Courts to Hear Victim Impact Testimony; Require the Court to
Make a Finding Regarding Restitution in Sentencing Every
Accused Person; Add Legislative Findings to the “Crime Victims’
Bill of Rights”; Define Certain Terms; Expand the List of Crimes
Covered by the “Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights”; Change Provisions
Relating to Victim Notification to the Victim of Matters Relative to
a Criminal Case; Provide for Victim Notification of Events When
an Accused Is Committed to the Department of Behavioral Health
and Developmental Disabilities; Change Provisions Relating to the
Prosecuting Attorney’s Duties Relative to Victim Notification and
Provide for Notice to Victims Relating to Restitution; Provide for
Procedures for a Victim to be Interviewed by an Accused or His or
Her Attorney or Agent; Require That Victims of Crimes be Present
in the Courtroom Except Under Limited Circumstances; Change
Provisions Relative to the Rule of Sequestration; Provide Privilege
Protections to Communications between Victim Assistance
Personnel and Victims; Require the Attorney General to Notify
Prosecuting Attorneys of Certain Matters in Death Penalty Cases;
Provide for Victims to Prevent an Accused from Sending Any Form
of Written, Text, or Electronic Communication to Such Victim, the
Victim’s Family, or the Victim’s Household; Article 3 of Chapter 5
of Title 42 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to
Conditions of Detention, so as to Change Certain Provisions
Relating to Transmittal of Information on Convicted Persons and
Place of Detention; Change the provision that Allows Convicted
Persons to Remain in Local Jails under Certain Circumstances;
Provide for Related Matters; Repeal Conflicting Laws; and for
Other Purposes.
29
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O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-64.2, -78, -155
(amended); 17-10-1.2 (amended); 1714-3 (amended); 17-17-1, -3, -5
(amended); 17-17-5.1 (new); 17-17-8
(amended); 17-17-8.1 (new); 17-17-9
(amended); 17-17-9.1 (new); 17-17-12
(amended); 17-17-12.1 (new); 24-961.1 (amended); 42-5-50 (amended)
HB 567
403
2010 Ga. Laws 214
The Act provides for crime victims’
rights in Georgia and creates
substantive mechanisms for directing
agencies to carry out these rights. It
establishes comprehensive reform
providing nine basic victims’ rights.
These include the right to be present
and heard in the sentencing phase of a
criminal proceeding against the
accused, including proceedings in
juvenile court. The Act also provides
that victims must be notified regarding
the disposition of criminal proceedings
or the status of the accused, such as
release or escape, and requires the
prosecuting attorney or the corrections
department to provide such notice.
Judges are also required to make a
finding in every case as to whether
restitution to the victim from the
accused is appropriate. Further, it
provides that the victim may refuse an
interview from an agent (such as an
attorney) of the accused and that such
an agent must clearly identify that he
represents the accused. Victims and
families are also protected against
contact from the accused. Finally, the

2

: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Crime Victims' Bill of Rights

2010]

EFFECTIVE DATE:

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

31

Act provides for changes relating to the
transportation of convicted persons to
correctional institutions.
July 1, 2010

History
The Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights provides that victims of crime
and their families have rights including the following: to be heard in
court; to have a hearing on restitution where appropriate; and to be
notified regarding the status of the accused or convicted offender.1
Additionally, the Act, for the first time, expands the victims’ right to
be heard during juvenile proceedings.2 In its final form, House Bill
(HB) 567 passed with little opposition in the House by 158 “yeas” to
1 “nay”3 and passed unanimously in the Senate.4 The bill, however,
went through numerous changes and faced stiff opposition, primarily
based on a controversial version of Section 11 included in the bill’s
earlier versions.5 Work on crafting legislation covering victims’
rights actually began sometime in June 2009, when a group of
legislators were instructed to create a draft of the potential bill to be
introduced.6
Victim impact statements previously were disfavored at law. Prior
to the 1990s, victim impact statements were not allowed to influence
sentencing in Georgia courts. In the 1974 Muckle v. State decision,
the Georgia Supreme Court reversed a life imprisonment sentence
1. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1 (Supp. 2010).
2. Id. § 15-11-64.2(d); see also Video Recording of House of Representatives Judiciary Non-Civil
Committee Proceedings, Jan. 5, 2010 at 26 min., 39 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting
Attorneys’ Council),
http://media.legis.ga.gov/hav/09/comm/judynon/judynon010509.wmv [hereinafter House Comm. Jan. 5
Video]. Code section 17-17-1 does not apply to juvenile court proceedings. See 1996 Ga. Op. Att’y Gen.
U96-1.
3. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 567 (Mar. 26, 2010).
4. Georgia Senate Voting Record, HB 567 (Apr. 14, 2010).
5. See Telephone Interview with Don Samuel, Partner, Garland, Samuel and Loeb, Member,
Georgia Association of Defense Attorneys (Apr. 1, 2010) (on file with the Georgia State University Law
Review) [hereinafter Samuel Interview]; see also HB 567 (LC 29 4112ERS), § 11, p. 10–11, ln. 337–60,
2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. (deleted subsection Section 11(f) which provided for contempt of court for
attorneys who violated this Act).
6. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 15 min., 6 sec. (remarks by Subcomm. Chairman
Rep. Rich Golick (R-34th)).
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imposed on a rapist and remanded for a new sentencing.7 The rape
victim’s husband and her university professor were allowed to testify
as to her change in personality and decreased academic performance
following the attack.8 Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that current Georgia law did not allow the “severity of the
punishment [to] depend on the emotional state of the unfortunate
victim.”9
Additionally, the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution was once construed to disallow victim impact statements
in capital murder trials.10 In Booth v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
reasoned that allowing victim impact statements would cause the
death penalty to be imposed in an arbitrary manner: some victims
either would not leave behind a family or be less articulate in
describing their loss even if it was equally severe to the loss of
others.11 Likewise, the Court was concerned that such evidence
shifted focus away from the defendant and what he knew when he
committed the crime.12 Relying on Booth, the Supreme Court in
South Carolina v. Gathers affirmed that a prosecutor engaged in
improper conduct during a capital murder prosecution, when he read
from the religious literature a murder victim carried at the time of his
death and inferred positive qualities about him.13
The Supreme Court reversed itself a short time later in Payne v.
Tennessee.14 The majority held that “the Eight Amendment erects no
per se bar” to victim impact statements.15 The Court reasoned that it
was unfair to allow the defendant to put on mitigating evidence about
7. Muckle v. State, 233 Ga. 337, 338, 211 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1974).
8. Id. at 337, 362.
9. Id. at 339, 363.
10. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808
(1991). The Booth Court relied on the Eight Amendment of the United States Constitution, “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505–06.
12. Id. at 505.
13. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811–12 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808 (1991). Moreover, the Court held that it was also misconduct to infer positive qualities based
on the voter registration card that the victim had in his papers at the time of his murder. Id.
14. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
15. Id. at 827. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion was joined by two other Justices and stated
that Booth both “significantly harms our criminal justice system and is egregiously wrong” and had
“plainly inadequate rational support.” Id. at 834 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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his good character while denying victims or their survivors a chance
to express the impact or loss caused by the defendant’s actions.16 The
Court expressed the need to right the unfairness caused by Booth by
quoting Justice Cardozo: “[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due
to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it
is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.”17
Georgia law, nevertheless, continued to disallow victim impact
statements as late as 1992.18 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Payne that the Eighth Amendment
was no “per se bar” to victim impact statements, but still found that
then-codified Georgia law did not allow evidence of the
psychological impact of the crime on the victim.19 The Georgia high
court noted that Muckle v. State was “intended to avoid confusion and
prejudicial digression in sentencing.”20 The next year, the Georgia
legislature changed the law, specifically allowing for victim impact
statements in death penalty cases at the discretion of the trial judge so
long as they did not “inflame or unduly prejudice the jury.”21 The
law, nonetheless, was not applicable to juvenile court proceedings.22
In terms of providing rights beyond victim impact statements,
Georgia’s previous Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights has been described
by Spencer Lawton from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council as “a
triumph of sentiment over substance.”23 While it pointed to the
various rights that crime victims have, the previous Code did little to
nothing in the way of directing the different agencies in how to
provide those rights.24 This rendered the legislation ineffective in
living up to its promise.
HB 567 was introduced by Representatives Don Parsons (R-42nd)
and Wendell Willard (R-49th) in the 2009 legislative session.25
16. See id. at 825–27 (majority opinion).
17. Id. at 827 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)).
18. Sermons v. State, 262 Ga. 286, 417 S.E.2d 144 (1992).
19. Id. at 287–88.
20. Id.
21. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2(a)(2) (Supp. 2009).
22. 1996 Op. Ga. Att’y Gen. U96-1, available at http://law.ga.gov/00/opinion_print/
0,2669,87670814_90686057_109614944,00.html.
23. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 23 min., 51 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton,
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).
24. Id. at 23 min., 51 sec.
25. HB 567 Bill Tracking, supra note 4.
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Representative Parsons introduced the bill after receiving a call from
a Cobb County constituent who was the father of a homicide victim.26
Dr. Bruce Cook and Mr. Gordon Rondo, members of the Georgia
Crime Victim’s Advocacy Council, wanted Georgia to have a
victims’ bill of rights modeled after similar legislation in other states
and at the federal level.27
The Georgia bill is modeled heavily after the federal crime
victims’ rights statute passed in 2004.28 The federal legislation itself
appears to be based on a series of amendments made to state
constitutions, including Arizona, Illinois, Michigan, and Texas,
starting in 1988.29 Many states, however, provide rights by statute to
crime victims. For example, in 1994, Kentucky was the first to
provide automated telephone information to crime victims regarding
the status of the offender.30
After agreeing to take up the bill on behalf of his constituents,
Representative Parsons decided he needed to work with a lawyer who
had experience on the Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, where this
type of legislation is written.31 He then took the idea of a crime
victims’ bill to Representative Willard, who was very supportive.32
Willard encouraged Representative Parsons to proceed with the
legislation saying, “I think we can probably do some things to
strengthen victims’ rights.”33 Both agreed that the central thrust of the
26. See Interview with Rep. Don Parsons, in Atlanta, Ga. (R-42nd) (Mar. 3, 2010) [hereinafter
Parsons Interview].
27. See id.; Telephone Interview with Dr. Bruce Cook, Crime Victim’s Advocacy Council (May 5,
2010) [hereinafter Cook Interview]; see also Video Recording of House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee
Proceedings, Mar. 17, 2010 at 21 min., 23 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting Attorneys’
Council), http://media.legis.ga.gov/hav/09/ comm/judynon/judynon031710.wmv [hereinafter House
Comm. Mar. 17 Video].
28. See Parsons Interview, supra note 26; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. 2009).
29. Michigan was the first to ratify the language into their constitution in 1988. MICH CONST. art. I,
§ 24. Arizona ratified very similar language into their state constitution in 1990. ARIZ . CONST. art. II, §
2.1. Illinois followed suit in 1992. ILL CONST. art. I, § 8.1. Around the same time period, many states
were adopting constitutional amendments to protect the rights of crime victims, though not necessarily
based on similar wording. See Maryland Crime Victims’ Resource Center, Inc., The History of Crime
Victims'
Rights
In
America,
http://www.mdcrimevictims.org/_pages/e_legislation_policy/
e2_legis_federal.htm (last visited Jun. 26, 2010); see also Parsons Interview, supra note 26.
30. National Center for Victims of Crime, Crime Victims’ Rights in America: A Historical Overview,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/1999/histr.htm; see also Maryland Crime Victims’ Resource
Center, Inc., supra note 29.
31. See Parsons Interview, supra note 26.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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bill would be to increase the role of victims in the criminal justice
system in proceedings that affect them.34
Bill Tracking
Consideration and Passage by the House
Representatives Don Parsons (R-42nd) and Wendell Willard (R49th), respectively, sponsored HB 567.35 The House of
Representatives read the bill for the first time on February 26, 2009,36
and for the second time on March 3, 2009.37 After Speaker of the
House David Ralston (R-7th) assigned it to the Ramsey
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, the bill was
favorably reported on March 18, 2009.38
The bill, as introduced, focused on clarifying the rights of victims
in the criminal justice system.39 In the original Code section 17-17-1
(1995), the legislature set out the policy that victims “should be
accorded certain basic rights just as the accused are accorded certain
basic rights,”40 but did not specifically enumerate those rights.41
Victims’ Rights and Assertion Issues
Code section 17-17-1 went through several changes in the House.
In the first version of the bill, eight specific rights of victims’ were
added to the Code section:42
the right to be reasonably protected from the accused,43 the right
to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 567, Apr. 29, 2010.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See HB 567 (LC35 1317), Preamble, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
40. 1995 Ga. Laws 385, § 2, at 385 (formerly codified at O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1 (Supp. 2009)).
41. Id.
42. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p.1, ln. 16–41, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
43. There was a brief discussion about using the term ‘accused’ to refer to the criminal defendant,
while using the more definite term ‘victim’ to refer to the citizen who is believed to have suffered the
criminal conduct. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 55 min., 10 sec. (remarks by Rep. Bobby
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proceeding involving the crime perpetuated against them or of
any release or escape of the accused; the right not to be excluded
from any such public proceeding, unless the court, after
receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that
testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim
heard testimony from a witness; the right to be heard at any
public proceeding involving the release, plea, sentencing, or
parole of the accused; the right to confer with the attorney for the
state in any criminal prosecution related to the state; the right to
restitution as provided by law; the right to proceedings free from
unreasonable delay; and the right to be treated fairly and with
respect for the victim's dignity.44

The next portion of amendments to Code section 17-17-1 in the
bill, as introduced, addressed who could assert these rights. They
could be asserted by victims, their agents, or prosecutors.45 The court
to address these claims would be the one in which the accused was
being prosecuted, or if no prosecution was currently under way, then
the court with jurisdiction over the location of the crime would
address the issues.46 The remaining portion of this section granted
victims a fairly broad power to challenge a denial of their rights
under this section by the court.47 The victim was able to petition the
Court of Appeals to issue a writ of mandamus contesting the
decision.48 If the writ issued, the court would be required to decide its
application within seventy-two hours.49
This entire portion of changes to Code section 17-17-1 was deleted
in the next version of the bill, partly due to concerns that the victims
Franklin (R-43rd), Subcomm. Chairman Rep. Rich Golick (R-34th), and Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting
Attorneys’ Council). Both terms were kept as consistent with proper technical legal structure. Id.
Representative Franklin subsequently sponsored HB 1181 along with Representative Charlice Byrd (R20th), Representative Mark Hatfield (R-177th), Representative Tom Knox (R-24th), and Representative
Randal Mangham (D-94th). State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1181, Apr. 29, 2010.
HB 1181 sought to change the word ‘victim’ to ‘accuser’ throughout the Georgia criminal code in
situations where a criminal conviction had not been returned against the defendant; however, the bill
only made it to a second reading on February 17, 2010, and did not survive Cross-Over Day. Id.
44. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p.1, ln. 16–41, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
45. Id. § 1, p.1, ln. 42–43.
46. Id. § 1, p.1, ln. 29–34.
47. Id. § 1, p.2, ln. 37–41.
48. Id. § 1, p.1, ln. 47–49.
49. Id. § 1, p.2, ln. 49–51.
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would be “transformed into a party to the criminal action and have an
independent right to sue the judges or any other actors in the criminal
justice system, where they feel their rights have been abused.”50
The original bill also amended Code section 17-17-15, which
curtailed the right granted in the introduced version of Code section
17-17-1 for victims to challenge a decision that denied them their
rights:51
[I]n no case shall a failure to afford a right under this chapter
provide grounds for a new trial; provided, however, that in any
appeal in a criminal case, the prosecutor may assert as error the
court's denial of any crime victim's right in the [case] to which
the appeal relates.52

The rest of this section stated that although the victim does not
have standing to participate as a party to the criminal action, they
may file a motion contesting the plea or sentence if these
requirements are met:
(1) The victim has asserted the right to be heard before or during
the proceeding at issue and such right was denied;
(2) The victim petitions the Court of Appeals for a writ of
mandamus within ten days; and
(3) In the case of a plea, the accused has not pled to the highest
offense charged.53

All of the revisions made to Code section 17-17-15 were deleted in
the next version of HB 567.54
The Committee was also concerned about victims being granted
the right to file complaints, which it addressed in the amendments to
Code section 15-11-64.2 regarding juvenile proceedings55 and Code

50. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 29 min., 25 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton,
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).
51. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 6, p.5, ln. 138–57, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
52. Id. § 6, p.5, ln. 143–46.
53. Id. § 6, p.5, ln. 149–53.
54. Compare id. with HB 567 (LC29 4284S), 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
55. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p.2, ln. 37–41, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
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section 17-10-1.2 regarding adult proceedings.56 There was debate
during the January 5, 2010 meeting of the House Judiciary Non-Civil
Committee about whether the legislature has the authority to permit
such complaints to be filed. Representative Kevin Levitas (D-82nd)
expressed concern about potential separation of powers issues created
by the provision:
I don’t know that the legislature can declare to the court what a
violation of a judicial canon is. [T]here might be a way to reword
that, but I do not believe we have the power, the legislature, to
declare
[whether]
a
judicial
canon . . . [has]
been
violated . . . . [M]y concern is obviously we need to have a
constitutional amendment for doing that. . . . [I]t definitely seems
that sometimes judges need a little guiding hand to make sure
they stick to the law, but the question is how we do that. What I
don’t want to do is pass this bill only to have somebody bring a
constitutional objection to it and have it overturned.57

Chairman Golick expressed similar concerns, noting that “[the
judges will] probably bristle at the audacity of us to say something is
a violation.”58 Lawton assured the committee that there have been
instances in the past where the legislature established violations, so
this provision should not be objectionable.59

56. HB 567 (LC29 4284S), § 4, p.4, ln. 155–57, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
57. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 27 min., 56 sec (remarks by Rep. Kevin Levitas (D82nd)).
58. Id. at 32 min., 10 sec (remarks by Subcomm. Chairman Rep. Rich Golick (R-34th)).
Representative Bob Franklin (R-43rd) questioned the level of deference granted to judges, saying, “[I]f a
judge violates a right, why should the judge be immune simply because he wears a state-issued
costume?” Id. at 35 min., 23 sec.
59. Id. at 27 min., 56 sec (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). But see id.
at 52 min., 12 sec (remarks by Jill Travis, House Legislative Counsel) (“I just wanted to add . . . that [on
the] concern about the code of judicial conduct, I did search the code and violating the canons is in fact
nowhere else in the code; this would be new. And because the [Georgia] Supreme Court issues the
judicial canon[s] . . . I do have concerns about this provision.”).
Golick stated that this issue would be discussed in more detail later in the committee meeting,
but this problem was in fact never addressed again during the January 5, 2010 meeting. Id. at 53 min., 10
sec. (remarks by Subcomm. Chairman Rep. Rich Golick (R-34th)).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss1/2

10

: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Crime Victims' Bill of Rights

2010]

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

39

Procedures and Process
The bill, as introduced, amended Code section 17-17-6 to add that
during law enforcement or court personnel’s initial contact with the
victim, the victim should be given information about the potential
availability of restitution where applicable.60 This emphasis on
restitution corresponds with the original inclusion of restitution as a
victim’s right in the amended Code section 17-17-161 and with a
section added by the House Subcommittee in a later version of the
bill, which requires the court to set a specific dollar amount when
ordering the restitution owed to the victim.62 All of the revisions
made to Code section 17-17-6 in this section were deleted in the next
version of HB 567.63
Victim Notification
The bill, as introduced, amended Code section 17-17-13 to provide
that when an accused is convicted, the prosecutor is required to notify
victims of their right to be notified of any impending clemency or
release proceedings related to the accused.64 These revisions to Code
section 17-17-13 were deleted in the Act.65
Concerns about efficiency with notification were expressed in
response to the language in the introduced amendments to Code
section 17-17-5.66 The existing Code section 17-17-12 provided that
victims only needed to be notified of appellate proceedings handled
by the Attorney General in death penalty cases,67 but the original bill
language would have expanded the duty to include, in addition to
capital cases, “other violent offense[s] against the victim, including,
but not limited to, assault, battery, child molestation, rape, or other

60. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 3, p. 3, ln. 72, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
61. Id. § 1, p.1, ln. 39.
62. O.C.G.A. § 17-14-3(a) (Supp. 2010).
63. Compare HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 3, p. 3, ln. 72, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. with HB 567 (LC29
4284S), 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
64. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 4, p.4, ln. 129–30, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
65. Compare id. with HB 567 (LC35 1866S), 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
66. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1 hr., 41 min., 3 sec. (remarks by unnamed Parole
Board representative).
67. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-12 (Supp. 2009).
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sexual assault,”68 no matter what sentence was given.69 The Parole
Board voiced concerns as to the potential ramifications of this
language during the January 5, 2010 House Judiciary Non-Civil
Committee proceedings:
That’s very broad language . . . . [and] difficult because we have
a lot of situations where the person has technically violated the
terms of the electronic monitoring if they get home from
work . . . late, and I don't think that would . . . make
sense . . . [to] notif[y] in those circumstances. Another instance
would be if they’re on parole [for] br[eaking] into [a] shed and
st[ealing] a lawnmower then . . . . we would be notifying . . . [the
victim]. [W]e recommend[] . . . refined language to narrow
it . . . to where there is a victim, and it is a serious violation of
their electronic monitoring requirements.70

In response, the committee added language requiring notification
of when the defendant violates the terms of the monitoring program
only when the violations “trigger the issuance of a[n] [arrest]
warrant”71 and contact between the defendant and the victim is
prohibited.72
Victims and Defense Counsel Interaction
An elusive early version of HB 567 (not on file in the clerk’s
office) sparked a battle in the Judiciary Committee.73 This version
created Code section 17-17-8.1.74 Prosecutors and defense attorneys
circulated dueling memos before the March 11, 2010 hearing
between the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and

68. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 4, p.4, ln. 97–99, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
69. Id. § 4, p.4, ln. 110–14.
70. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1 hr., 41 min., 3 sec. (remarks by unnamed Parole
Board representative).
71. Id.; HB 567 (LC29 4284S), § 8, p.8, ln. 255, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
72. HB 567 (LC29 4284S), § 8, p.8, ln. 253–56, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
73. See Samuel Interview, supra note 5.
74. HB 567 (LC29 4112ERS), § 1, p.10–11, ln. 336–60, 2010, Ga. Gen. Assem. (on file with
Georgia State University Law Review).
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the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council.75 The heavily disputed Code
section 17-17-8.1 provides specifically for the right of the victim to
refuse or limit the scope of an interview by the accused or the
agent/attorney of the accused.76 Subsection (c) provided for an
attorney-client-like relationship between the victim and the
prosecutor:77
(c) If specifically requested by the victim, the prosecuting
attorney shall advise the accused or the accused’s attorney in
writing that the victim has directed that they shall communicate
with the victim only through the prosecuting attorney or his or
her designee. Once the accused has been so notified, the
prosecuting attorney shall promptly inform the victim of the
accused’s request for an interview.78

Additionally, subsection (f) provided for criminal contempt of court
punishment for any violation of this section.79
The Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (GACDL)
vigorously objected to the aforementioned subsections.80 Members
Don Samuel, Sandra Michaels, and Jack Martin wrote a memo to the
Judiciary Committee after this section found its way into this early
version of the bill.81 They argued that it was the duty of a defense
attorney to attempt to interview any witness who may have
information about the facts of the case, and that empowering the

75. See generally id. The version of the bill with the controversial language referenced was
circulated in part with the aforementioned memorandum before the March 11, 2010 hearing. Id. § 1,
p.10–11, ln. 348–52, 2010, Ga. Gen. Assem. (on file with Georgia State University Law Review).
76. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-18.1 (Supp. 2010).
77. See Memorandum from Ga. Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers on Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights
Section 11 to the Ga. House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2010) (on file with Ga. State Law Review). See
generally Samuel Interview, supra note 5.
78. HB 567 (LC29 4112ERS), § 11, p. 10–11, ln. 348–52, p. 10–11, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. (on file
with Georgia State University Law Review).
79. Id. § 11, p. 10–11, ln. 359–60 (on file with Georgia State University Law Review);
Memorandum from Ga. Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers on Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights Section 11
to the Ga. House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2010) (on file with Ga. State Law Review).
80. Memorandum from Ga. Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers on Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights
Section 11 to the Ga. House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2010) (on file with Ga. State Law Review).
81. Id.
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District Attorney to advise the victim of his rights “skews the role of
counsel in the pretrial stage of a trial.”82
Additionally, the GACDL members argued that it was
unconstitutional to hold defense counsel in contempt based on a letter
from the District Attorney.83 Such a procedure interferes with the
Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants to zealous
representation and the ethical duty of an attorney to provide it.84
Moreover, they argued, a prosecutor is prohibited from interfering
with a defense attorney’s right to interview witnesses.85
In response to the GACDL, Spencer Lawton stated that a
compromise between prosecutors and defense attorneys was “beyond
reach” with regards to section 11 and insisted that the purpose of the
section was to protect victims from unwanted contact by the
defense.86 Lawton argued that the bill merely codified existing rights
victims already have (to refuse an interview) and powers prosecutors
already have (to advise victims of their rights).87 While agreeing that
victims are not an actual party to a criminal action, he said that the
relationship between a prosecutor and a victim “demands that the
prosecutor be able to protect the victim from assault.”88
The House subcommittee later removed the language that the
defense attorney “shall communicate with the victim only through the
prosecutor attorney or his or her designee.”89 Moreover, the provision
providing for criminal contempt penalties was deleted.90 In place of
the old language, the bill provides that the victim may refuse an
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (holding that
failure to examine the defendant’s criminal history and uncover relevant mitigating circumstances
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
85. Memorandum from the Ga. Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers on Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights
Section 11 to the Ga. House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2010) (on file with Georgia State University Law
Review); see Sosebee v. State, 190 Ga. App. 746, 748, 380 S.E.2d 464, 466 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing
Rutledge v. State, 245 Ga. 768, 267 S.E.2d 199 (1980)).
86. Memorandum from the Prosecuting Attorney’s Council on HB 567 – Crime Victims’ Bill of
Rights (Section 11) to the House Judiciary Comm. (non-Civil) Ramsey Subcomm. (Mar. 10, 2010) (on
file with Georgia State University Law Review).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Compare HB 567 (LC29 4112ERS), § 11, p.10–11, ln. 348–52, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. with HB
567 (LC29 4284S), § 1, p.10–11, ln. 324–46, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
90. HB 567 (LC29 4284S), § 1, p.1, ln. 324–46, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
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interview and a defense attorney may not contact a victim in an
“unreasonable manner.”91
Passage by the House
On March 26, 2010, the final version of HB 567 was presented to
the House by Representative Don Parsons (R-47th).92 Representative
Stephanie Benfield (D-85th) thanked the members of the Judiciary
Non-Civil Committee for resolving the controversy with regards to
section 11 and a defense attorney’s access to the victim.93 She was
pleased with the final result.94 Representative Bobby Reese (R-98th)
asked why a social security number would need to be provided and
wondered why the bill did not provide for email contact as a costsaving measure.95 Representative Parsons replied that the social
security number would be necessary for restitution purposes and that
it was a big step for Georgia to expand contact methods beyond a
land telephone.96 Representative Reese agreed to the change in the
victim contact method, commenting, “Sometimes you gotta [sic] take
what you can get,” and remarked that he wished this bill would have
been passed several years ago.97
Finally, Representative Bobby Franklin (R-43rd) rose to speak
against the bill.98 He warned members of the house against
“assert[ing] this body is God” by suggesting that rights come from
civil government.99 While he agreed with the bill’s intentions, he was
very concerned about referring to the newly mandated procedures as

91. See id. § 1, p.1, ln. 337, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
92. Video Recording of Georgia House of Representatives House Session Mar. 26, 2010 at 1 min.
[hereinafter House Session].
93. Id. at 9 min., 36 sec.; see also supra notes 74–93 and accompanying text.
94. House Session, supra note 92, at 9 min., 36 sec.
95. Id. at 10 min., 10 sec.
96. Id. at 11 min.
97. Id. at 12 min., 10 sec. However, Representative Reese later voted “nay” on the Senate substitute
version, even though it retained the unchanged and completely identical provisions and wording
regarding victim rights. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 567 (Apr. 21, 2001); see
also infra note 107.
98. House Session, supra note 92, at 13 min.
99. Id. at 15 min.
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“rights” entitled to the victim.100 Subsequently, voting commenced
and the bill passed 158 to 1.101
Consideration and Passage by the Senate
HB 567 was sponsored in the Senate by Senator John Wiles (R37th) and was read for the first time on March 30, 2010.102 Senate
President Pro Tempore Tommie Williams (R-19th) assigned it to the
Senate Special Judiciary Committee, which favorably reported on
April 1, 2010.103 The committee drafted a substitute to the House
version of HB 567, but changed none of the existing bill language.104
The only addition to HB 567 made in the Senate substitute is the
addition of amendments to Code section 42-5-50, deleting a provision
that allowed convicted defendants to be housed in local jails during
the appellate process instead of being processed into the state prison
system immediately.105 The addition of this Code section does not
appear related to the overall theme of crime victims’ rights that
otherwise unifies the Act. In the end, the Senate passed the bill
unanimously on April 14, 2010, with no objections or debate.106
Passage of the Senate Substitute by the House
On April 21, 2010, the House agreed to the Senate substitute by a
vote of 151 to 2.107 The bill was then sent to the Governor on May
10, 2010.108 HB 567 became Act 403 upon being signed into law by
Governor Sonny Perdue on May 20, 2010.109
100. Id.
101. Id. at 16 min., 15 sec. The single “nay” vote was from Representative Bobby Franklin (R-43rd).
Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 567 (Mar. 26, 2001).
102. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 567, Apr. 29, 2010.
103. See id.
104. See generally HB 567 (LC35 1866S), 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. (all sections are identical to HB 567
(LC29 4284S) except for Section 17).
105. Id. § 17, p. 15, ln. 488–500, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
106. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 567, Apr. 29, 2010.
107. The two “nay” votes were cast by Representative Bobby Franklin and Representative Bobby
Reese. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 567 (Apr. 21, 2001).
108. See Georgia General Assembly, HB 567, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10
/sum/hb567.htm.
109. Id.
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The Act
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Act deal with juvenile court
proceedings.110 The most significant part of the revisions to the
existing juvenile Code sections is section 1, which gives victims the
right to address the court prior to the entry of a dispositional order in
juvenile court,111 aligning with the procedure in adult proceedings.112
The original Code section 15-11-64.2 provided for submission of
victim impact statements but made no mention of whether victims
were allowed to give oral testimony about their experience related to
the case in juvenile court.113 This change was made to ensure
consistency and “simply to conform juvenile procedure, with regard
to victim impact evidence, to the procedures that prevail in the adult
system.”114 For victim advocates a key feature of HB 567 is being
allowed to speak to the court instead of being limited to a paper
impact statement.
The amended Code section 15-11-64.2 permits a victim to speak to
the court, if the victim chooses, about the impact of the delinquent act
on themselves or their family, the need for restitution, or the terms of
the disposition order.115 Any statement presented by the victim has to
be given in the presence of the allegedly delinquent child, and the
victim must be subject to cross examination.116 The prosecuting
attorney and the allegedly delinquent child also have the opportunity
to explain, support, or deny the victim’s statement.117
The amended Code section also charges the juvenile court with
telling the victim of their right to address the court.118 If the victim
110. Although the first three sections of the Act make major changes to juvenile court proceedings,
the sponsors of HB 567 reported that no one from the juvenile justice reform project or any juvenile
court judges or defense attorneys were contacted when this provision was drafted, so the impact of this
language is uncertain. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 48 min., 13 sec.
111. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64.2(d) (Supp. 2010).
112. The right to address the court in adult proceedings was established in 2009. O.C.G.A. § 17-101.2 (Supp. 2009); House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 38 min., 22 sec (remarks by Charles
Olson, Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).
113. See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64.2 (Supp. 2009).
114. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 26 min., 39 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton,
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).
115. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64.2(d) (Supp. 2010).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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chooses not to appear at the dispositional hearing, they are considered
to have waived their rights under this section.119
Similar to the amended Code section 17-17-10.2 in section 4 of the
Act, juvenile court victims are also given the right to file a complaint
with the Judicial Qualifications Commission if the court intentionally
fails to comply with the amended Code section.120
Section 2 amends Code section 15-11-78, adding victims to the
parties that are allowed to be present during juvenile court
proceedings.121
Section 3 of the Act amends Code section 15-11-155, regarding
dispositional hearings for mental competency plans in juvenile
court.122 The Act merely replaces the word ‘statement’ for victim
impact ‘form.’123
Section 4 amends Code section 17-10-1.2, which deals with oral
victim impact statements in adult criminal proceedings.124 The Act
adds language giving prosecutors the right to make a proffer of
victim impact evidence if the judge chooses to exclude part of the
testimony.125 As in section 1 of the Act, the victim has the right under
this Code section to file a complaint with the Judicial Qualifications
Commission if the court intentionally fails to comply with this
section.126
The remainder of this section provides that if the case involves a
serious felony127 and the victim or their representative is not present
in court during the presentence hearing, the court must determine
whether the prosecutor properly notified the victim.128 If the
prosecutor did not do so, then the proceedings are stopped until the
victim is located and to allow the victim to travel to the court.129
119. Id.
120. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64.2(e) (Supp. 2010).
121. Id. § 15-11-78(e).
122. Id. § 15-11-55(b).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 17-10-1.2.
125. Id. § 17-10-1.2(a)(3).
126. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2(a)(3) (Supp. 2010); id. § 15-11-64.2(e).
127. The term ‘violent felony’ is defined in Code section 17-10-6.1 and includes murder or felony
murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, and
aggravated child molestation, unless the offense is charged as a misdemeanor subject to the provisions
of paragraph two of subsection (d) of Code Section 16-6-4. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1 (Supp. 2009).
128. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2(a)(5) (Supp. 2010).
129. Id.
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However, if the accused or the state has witnesses present to testify,
then those witnesses will be called before the hearing is recessed.130
Section 5 of the Act amends Code section 17-14-3, which deals
with restitution.131 The language added here requires the court to
make a specific finding of the amount of restitution owed to the
victim when sentencing the defendant.132 Formerly, the court could
simply order that restitution was owed without determining the dollar
amount,133 making collection difficult. For example, the parole board
is authorized to enforce restitution orders, but only if the court
specified the amount due.134
Even if the amount cannot be collected immediately because the
defendant is indigent, the judgment remains effective if and when the
defendant possesses sufficient resources to pay.135 The restitution
order is treated like a civil judgment and provides the same rights,
such as garnishing the defendant’s wages.136
Section 6 of the Act amends Code section 17-17-1, which
collectively lists all of the victims’ rights granted by the Code.137
Most of the language is unchanged from the House Subcommittee
version of HB 567, except that the right not to be excluded from the
courtroom was strengthened, and one new right was added.138 The
previous version of the bill permitted the judge to exclude the victim
if “after receiving clear and convincing evidence [the court]
determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if

130. Id.
131. Id. § 17-14-3(a).
132. Id.
133. See id.; see House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1hr., 7 min., 12 sec (remarks by Spencer
Lawton, Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council) (“[T]he code now says that the court shall impose restitution,
but . . . if they don't, nothing comes of it.”).
134. See House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1hr., 17 min., 2 sec (remarks by Charles Olson,
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).
135. Id. at 1hr., 8 min., 31 sec (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).
136. Id. at 1 hr., 16 min., 20 sec. (remarks by Representative Matt Ramsey (R-72nd)). However, the
granting of broad recovery rights does not signify that the types of restitution damages allowed are
similarly expanded. Discussion on this issue was somewhat conflicting, but it appears that damages
based on a wrongful death claim would be considered restitution but loss of consortium damages would
not. See id. at 1 hr., 18 min., 55 sec. (remarks by Representative Doug Collins (R-27); Charles Olson,
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council; Representative Ed Setzler (R-35th)).
137. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1(3) (Supp. 2010).
138. Compare HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p.1, ln. 17–21, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. with O.C.G.A. § 1717-1(3) (Supp. 2010).

Published by Reading Room, 2010

19

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2

48

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1

the victim heard testimony from a witness,”139 while the Act also
permits exclusion if it is otherwise required by law.140 Therefore, the
Act eliminates the court’s exercise of discretion regarding exclusion
of the victim.
Section 7 of this version revises Code section 17-17-3, which
provides definitions of terms used in this title. Under the new
definition of “victim,” a person is considered a victim even if it is not
certain that a crime has actually been committed.141 The new terms
added and defined by the subcommittee in this version are “arrest”142
and “criminal justice agency.”143
Sections 8 and 9 add new events to provide notification “of
changes in a defendant’s status, times when a victim might
reasonably feel some anxiety about the defendant’s status change,
and we want them to know what’s going on.”144 The new code
sections provide extra protection to victims and will increase the
victim’s safety and sense of well-being.
Section 8 amends Code section 17-17-5, concerning the manner
victims would be notified of changes in the case. The existing Code
language, which was enacted in 1995, provided that the contact
number for the victim could not be a “pocket pager or electronic
communication device number.”145 This version was updated to
encompass current technology and delete that limitation, permitting
cellular phone numbers to be used to contact victims, as well as
electronic mail addresses and mailing addresses.146

139. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p.1, ln. 17–21, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
140. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1(3) (Supp. 2010). This limitation now applies to immediate family members
of a victim. Id. § 17-17-9(a).
141. Id. § 17-17-3(11)(A).
142. Id. § 17-17-3(1.1) (“An actual custodial restraint of a person or the person's submission to
custody and includes the taking of a child into custody.”).
143. Id. § 17-17-3(4.1) (“An arresting law enforcement agency, custodial authority, investigating law
enforcement agency, prosecuting attorney, or the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.”).
144. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1 hr., 43 min., 2 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton,
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).
145. 1995 Ga. Laws 385, § 2, at 385 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 17-17-5 (Supp. 2009)).
146. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-5 (Supp. 2010). An earlier version of the bill listed different specific contact
methods, HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 2, p. 2, ln. 50–52, 55–58, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem., but the Act requires
instead “[a] current address and telephone number.” O.C.G.A. § 17-7-5(b),(c) (Supp. 2010). A previous
version of the Act also provided that a victim could be notified via multiple means of communication if
that was what they requested. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 2, p. 2, ln. 52–53, 55–58, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
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Section 8 also provides that victims must be notified when the
defendant escapes and if and when he is rearrested,147 as well as
when the defendant is released and ordered to participate in an
electronic monitoring program.148
Section 9 creates new Code section 17-17-5.1, which requires,
upon written request, victim notification at least ten days before the
defendant is released if the defendant was committed to the
Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities.149
Notification is also required if the defendant escapes from that
custody.150 This requirement was added because some victims,
unaware that the defendant was no longer in custody, only learned of
the defendant’s release when the defendant appeared at their home.151
In addition, under the existing Code section, if the defendant was
incompetent to stand trial and released from custody, the victim did
not get notified.152
Section 10 amends Code section 17-17-8, first by providing a
procedural avenue for victims to recover their possessions from the
police when the items are no longer needed for evidentiary
purposes.153 This provision was included because there was often
confusion and miscommunication between the victim, police
department, and the district attorney’s office.154 Second, this section
describes the information155 victims need to supply if restitution is
sought and also requires that the prosecuting attorney transmit that
information to the relevant agency after informing the victim that
they will be doing so.156
Section 11 creates Code section 17-17-8.1 detailing procedures
involving interaction between the victim and the defendant’s
147. HB 567 (LC29 4284S), § 8, p.9, ln. 251, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
148. Id. § 8, p.9, ln. 252–53.
149. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-5.1(a) (Supp. 2010).
150. Id. § 17-17-5.1(b).
151. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1 hr., 49 min., 42 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton,
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).
152. Id. at 1 hr., 49 min., 40 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).
153. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-8(a)(5) (Supp. 2010).
154. See House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 53 min., 2 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton,
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council, and Rep. Doug Collins (R-27th)).
155. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-8(c)(1) (Supp. 2010). All information provided for this purpose is confidential,
cannot be used as evidence in any trial, and is not subject to subpoena or discovery. Id. § 17-17-8(c)(3).
156. Id. § 17-17-8(c)(1), (2).
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attorney, which generated significant controversy as discussed earlier
in this article.157 The victim is given the right to terminate, refuse, or
set conditions on any interview.158 Contact initiated by the defendant
or the defendant’s agent cannot be made in an unreasonable manner,
and the victim can request that no contact be attempted.159 The
protection of the victim is tempered by the mandate that prohibits
prosecuting attorneys from wrongly obstructing the defendant’s
access to the victim for interviews.160
Section 12 expands the prohibition on exclusion to include
victim’s family during criminal proceedings by revising Code section
17-17-9,161 and victim exclusion from proceedings is covered in
section 16 amending Code section 24-9-61.1.162 The theme of
encompassing family into the protected relationships is repeated in
section 15, which creates Code section 17-17-12.1 and describes the
procedure for blocking inmate mail.163 Another expansion of
protection is the application of attorney-work product status to
communications between the victim and victim advocate personnel
through creation of Code section 17-17-9.1 in section 13.164
Section 13 of the Act creates Code section 17-17-19.1, which
establishes that any communication between the victim and victim
assistance personnel appointed by the prosecuting attorney is
considered attorney-work product.165 This means those
communications are only subject to disclosure when it is required by
law.166 The purpose of this provision is to increase the victim’s
feeling of confidentiality during the court process.
Section 14 of the Act amends Code section 17-17-12 regarding
notification of appellate proceedings, the release of the defendant on
bail or recognizance, or the defendant’s motion for new trial or
appeal.167 It also amends Code section 17-17-12 to require the
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. § 17-17-8.1; see supra discussion pp. 17–20.
O.C.G.A. § 17-17-8.1(a), (b) (Supp. 2010).
Id. § 17-17-8.1(a), (c).
Id. § 17-17-8.1(e).
Id. § 17-17-9(a).
Id. § 24-9-61.1.
Id. § 17-17-12.1.
O.C.G.A. § 17-17-9.1 (Supp. 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 17-17-12.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss1/2

22

: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Crime Victims' Bill of Rights

2010]

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

51

prosecuting attorney to tell the victim that they need to request such
notification in writing.168 Once requested, the prosecuting attorney
provides notification to the victim.169 The victim’s right to
notification continues through any further trial court proceedings
ordered by the Court of Appeals.170
Section 15 of the Act creates Code section 17-17-12.1, which
outlines the procedures used to prevent inmates from contacting
victims or the victim’s family or household by mail.171 “Mail” is
defined in this Code section as follows:
any form of written communication, including, but not limited to,
letters, cards, postcards, packages, parcels, . . . e-mail, . . . text
messaging, and any other form of electronic communication
which is knowingly intended to be delivered to or received by a
victim, any member of the victim's family, or any member of the
victim's household.172

The juvenile court, or the prosecuting attorney in adult court, is
required to provide information to the victim about the mail blocking
process.173 The Department of Corrections and the Department of
Juvenile Justice are required to create a detailed system describing
how the victim can block inmate mail.174 If the victim requests that
mail be blocked, the appropriate agency175 must transmit the victim’s
contact information176 to the custodial authority, notify the inmate of
the mail block, and implement measures to prevent the inmate
violating the mail block.177

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-9.1 (Supp. 2010)..
171. Id. § 17-17-12.1.
172. Id. § 17-17-12.1(a).
173. Id. § 17-17-12.1(b)(3).
174. Id. § 17-17-12.1(c).
175. The agency would be either the Department of Corrections in adult superior court cases or the
Department of Juvenile Justice in Juvenile cases. Id.
176. The victim’s information will not be available to the public and is not subject to discovery unless
the court decides that the information is material and relevant to the case and provides information not
available from any other source. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-12.1(g) (Supp. 2010).
177. Id. § 17-17-12.1(d).
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Section 16 amending Code section 24-9-61.1 adds a reference to
Code section 17-17-9 regarding the victim’s right to be present in the
courtroom.178
Section 17 of the Act amends Code section 42-5-50, regarding
inmates—how and when defendants are processed into the penal
system.179 The new language requires convicted defendants to be
moved into the state system as soon as the administrative
requirements are met and no longer provides for exceptions due to
ongoing court proceedings in the same case.180
Analysis
In the end, the essential purpose of HB 567 is to provide substance
to the sentiment that Georgia should provide basic rights to victims of
crime and their families.181 Accordingly, the bill focuses on providing
for the right of victims to be present and heard, to be notified, and to
be provided restitution where appropriate.182 Additionally, the bill
provides guidance to various agencies in carrying out the state’s longstanding policy to accord basic rights to victims of crime.183
Specifically, victims of crime in Georgia (including relatives of
victims) now enjoy the following rights: the right to reasonable notice
regarding criminal proceedings; the right to reasonable notice
regarding the arrest, release, or escape of the accused; the right not to
be excluded from court proceedings except as required by law,
including juvenile proceedings; the right to be heard in proceedings
involving the release, plea, or sentencing of the accused; the right to
file a written objection in parole proceedings involving the accused;
the right to confer with the prosecuting attorney; the right to

178. Id. § 24-9-61.1.
179. Id. § 42-5-50.
180. Compare 2004 Ga. Laws 595, § 2 (formerly codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-5-50) (Supp. 2009)) with
HB 567 (LC35 1866S), § 17, p. 15, ln. 488–500, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.
181. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 23 min., 51 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton of
Prosecuting Attorney’s Council).
182. See HB 567, as introduced, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
183. See O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1 (Supp. 2009); see, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 17-17-5 (Supp. 2010); O.C.G.A. §
17-17-5.1 (Supp. 2010) (providing guidance as to how various agencies are responsible for keeping
victims informed about the status of the accused or offender).
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restitution; the right to proceedings free of unreasonable delay; and
the right to be treated fairly and with dignity.184
Crime victims’ advocate Drew Crecente recalls from his own
experience as the father of a homicide victim that he felt ignored by
the criminal justice system.185 He was kept in the dark by prosecutors
about a relatively lenient plea prosecutors negotiated with the
offender and was surprised when prosecutors failed to secure the
offender’s testimony in order to bring an accomplice to justice.186
Crecente says that it is important for society to recognize that it is not
just the state who has suffered a loss, but the loved ones of the victim
as well.187 “Communication, information, and knowledge [are] so
important,” he remarks.188
On the other hand, it is unclear how a victim, under HB 567, can
compel a court to comply with the law and force the court to hear
from him or her. As the later hearings made clear, the goal of the bill
is not to make the victim into a party in a criminal case, which,
according to Spencer Lawton of the Prosecuting Attorneys Council,
would “have devastating consequences for the system at its root.”189
For example, while the Act was designed to prevent judges from
deciding that they do not want to hear from a victim, the Prosecuting
Attorneys’ Council wants to avoid cases going up on appeal because
the victim was not heard from in a given case.190 Lawton is
concerned that giving victims this standing in Georgia’s process,
where sentencing is not necessarily a separate hearing from the
verdict, would be problematic for the system.191
While Dr. Bruce Cook from the Crime Victims Advocacy Council
feels crime victims are getting “the best we could get” in Georgia, he
is disappointed that victims do not have standing, the right to
appellate review, and the right to obtain a writ of mandamus if either
prosecutors fail to notify them or they are not present to make a
184. See generally O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1 (Supp. 2010).
185. See Interview with Drew Crecente, Founder of Jennifer Ann’s Group, a non-profit organization
dedicated to the prevention of teen dating violence (Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Crecente Interview].
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 32 min. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting
Attorneys’ Council).
190. Id. at 47 min.
191. Id. at 29 min., 38 sec.
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statement during sentencing.192 Dr. Cook says, in this sense, the bill
essentially has “no teeth” and is “tantamount to a suggestion” if
prosecutors fail to notify victims about their rights.193 Finally, he does
not see why, for example, federal courts and Arizona can give
victims standing while Georgia cannot. It seems likely that, if
prosecutors consistently or egregiously fail to comply with their
obligations under HB 567, crime victims may advocate for stronger
legislation.194
This issue of where victims fit exactly in the criminal justice
system model is a continuing problem. Spencer Lawton notes that in
other states with similar provisions, and in the federal courts, this
type of power given to victims has resulted in appellate courts
overturning sentences and remanding for new sentencing hearings at
which victims are granted their respective rights concerning the
case.195 Although an early version of the Act tried to constrain this
right by stating that a continuance to address the victim’s claims
could not last longer than five days,196 it is unclear how that would
have actually been executed.
The affected parties seem satisfied with the committee’s work in
resolving the section 11 controversy. Don Samuel says that he and his
colleagues in the Georgia Criminal Defense Lawyer’s association
(GACDL) are happy with the changes to section 11.197 Additionally,
Don Parsons feels “very good” about the Act and reports that crime
victims in Cobb County are pleased with the end result of the
legislative push to improve the state of victim’s rights in Georgia.198
He says that the criminal defense lawyers are “okay with it also.”199
He further explains that the Act was never intended to interfere with
the constitutional rights of the accused, but only to codify what
should be understood, that victims should be left alone if they wish
and never contacted in an unreasonable or unprofessional manner by
192. See Cook Interview, supra note 27.
193. Id.
194. See generally id.
195. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 29 min., 25 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton,
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).
196. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p. 2, ln. 38–40, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.
197. Samuel Interview, supra note 5.
198. Parsons Interview, supra note 26.
199. See id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss1/2

26

: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Crime Victims' Bill of Rights

2010]

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

55

an attorney representing the accused.200 As it stands, HB 567 was
enacted in a way that aims to avoid a legal challenge by GACDL.201
If the Supreme Court were to overrule Payne,202 HB 567 may face
an Eighth Amendment challenge, particularly as applied to cases
where the death penalty is sought. Georgia law now mandates that
judges allow victim impact statements to be offered “in all cases in
which the death penalty may be imposed.”203 Likewise, the Maryland
law struck down by the Supreme Court in Booth mandated that the
presentence report in all felony cases include a victim impact
statement.204 Potential challenges to the admissibility of victim
impact statements may insist that the harm done to the victim is
irrelevant to the “character of the offense and character of the
offender.”205 From Payne’s dissenting reasoning it follows that
victim impact statements are “constitutionally irrelevant” under the
Eighth Amendment; thus, allowing them to factor into a sentencing
decision increases the likelihood that the death penalty will be
applied arbitrarily based on emotion rather than reasoned
judgment.206
In the end, while all affected parties are generally optimistic that
Georgia has taken a significant step in the right direction, only time
will tell if the state will live up to its stated policy objective: making
the criminal justice system more responsive and helpful to those most
affected by crimes, the victims and their survivors.
Cameron Carpino & Christopher DeNeve

200. Id.
201. See, e.g., House Session, supra note 92, at 3 min. (remarks by Rep. Stephanie Benfield (D-85th),
thanking Rep. Parsons for working to eliminate the concerns of criminal defense attorneys).
202. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
203. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 (Supp. 2010).
204. MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986). See generally Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 498 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
205. Payne, 501 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
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